In our case, we made the customers who came to us to complain about being shortchanged on their gift cards whole with very little requirement for proof on their part. It is a customer relations problem as well… and the retailers that treat it as such are the ones that in the long run come out well. Gift Card fraud really is a public relations problem for retailers – it is not a financial problem per se, because the retailer has already been paid for the gift card and it is the customer that is losing out to the fraudster. That PIN was also printed on the card, but was hidden under a scratch off segment – it was a long (12 character if I remember) alphanumeric so it wasn’t something easily scripted to try to break. On the balance inquiry side, we eventually required the online PIN (which was required to use the card to purchase on our ecommerce website) in order to do an online balance inquiry.
#I WORK 08 SERIAL NUMBER VERIFICATION#
The solution that we came up with was the simple “last 4 digit” verification when redeeming the card in our stores… since the attack required rewriting the mag stripe of a card, the last 4 digits printed or embossed on the card did not match the last 4 digits of the account number in the magstripe.
#I WORK 08 SERIAL NUMBER SOFTWARE#
I’m also a POS software developer by trade and ran into this exact attack about 8 or 9 years ago (if I remember correctly).
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